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Plaintiffs Claimed "Snowed" By Ski Resort Operator Get a Lift From The 3rd Department

By Heath J. Szymczak, Esq.

Kosowsky, et al. v. Willard Mountain, Inc., et al.¸--- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2011 WL 5984277, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 08709 (3d Dept. December 1, 2011) presents some interesting issues involving the interplay between fraud and contract claims, as well as the potential slippery slope created when seeking to hold a corporate officer personally liable for an alleged breach of contract by a corporation.

Defendant Willard Mountain, Inc. is a corporation which operated a ski resort upon land owned by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs leased the property to Defendant under a lease which provided for: (i) computation of rental payments as a percentage of Defendant's sales and income, (ii) required Defendant to provide plaintiffs with an annual accounting, and (iii) prohibited assignment or subletting without plaintiffs' consent. Defendant's owner also operated a separate company offering concessions services at the ski area.

Plaintiffs claimed that Defendant had been paying less than the full amount of rent due under the lease because its president (and owner) had packed down its annual income through "slick" bookkeeping, thereby resulting in lower rental payments. Defendant claimed that the rental amount paid was proper because its own income was a function of the income received by the concessions company pursuant to a separate agreement (which had never been disclosed to the plaintiffs). Plaintiffs claimed that this agreement with the concession company violated the lease's prohibition against assignment. Plaintiffs asserted seven causes of action, including breach of contract and fraud, as well as claims against defendant's owner (individually) and against the concessions company.

Defendants moved to dismiss all the claims (except the breach of contract claim) for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR § 3211(a)(7), and to dismiss all the claims as time-barred under CPLR § 3211(a)(5) (or at least cap the recoverable period). Plaintiffs cross-moved for leave to file an amended complaint.

The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), in part, by dismissing the causes of action (i) seeking an accounting, (ii) alleging unjust enrichment, and (iii) alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court also held that the claims were not time-barred, and granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint. Defendants appealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed.

Fraud Claim Not Duplicative Of The Cause Of Action For Breach Of Contract
Defendants argued on appeal that the Supreme Court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' fraud claim because: (i) it was duplicative of the cause of action for breach of contract and (ii) it failed to contain allegations of justifiable reliance and special damages.

Generally, a misrepresentation premised directly on the same actions giving rise to a breach of contract does not give rise to a separate cause of action for fraud. Id. at *1 (citing Salvador v. Uncle Sam's Auctions & Realty, 307 A.D.2d 609, 611 (2003)). The Third Department, however, held that because of distinctions among the named parties (neither defendant's owner or the concessions company were parties to the lease) the breach of contract claim was not directed against the owner and could not be considered duplicative as to him. Further, as it was disputed that the concessions company was bound by the lease, the fraud claim against the concessions company could also proceed.

Moreover, the claim against Defendant Willard Mountain, Inc. could also proceed as plaintiffs claimed "that, after the contract was entered into, defendant [through the acts of its agent] repeatedly misrepresented or concealed existing facts" by failing to disclose the existence of the separate agreement with the concessions company and falsifying the annual income reports in order to (i) deceive them as to the true amount of rent owed, (ii) induce them to accept improperly low payments. Further, despite the absence of a fiduciary relationship, defendants allegedly breached a "duty of candor" (independent from their duty to perform under the contract) in that they had superior knowledge unavailable to plaintiffs and knew plaintiffs were relying on the information they supplied (citing Intl. Elecs., Inc. v. Media Syndication Global, Inc., 2002 WL 1897661, *2, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15200, *5-*6 (SD N.Y.2002)). The Third Department concluded that the conduct alleged in the fraud cause of action was sufficiently discrete from that underlying the breach of contract claim to state a viable separate cause of action.

Fraud Claim Not Lacking Allegations Of Justifiable Reliance And Special Damages
The Third Department also rejected defendants' contention that the fraud claim should have been dismissed for failure to plead the required elements of justifiable reliance and special damages (citing Dube-Forman v. D'Agostino, 61 AD3d 1255, 1257 (2009)). Plaintiffs alleged that they had relied upon the income figures provided by defendants in accepting the rent payments. They also claimed special damages (in addition to lost rent under the contract) as the alleged fraud prevented them from exercising their right to terminate the lease upon a breach of its terms, and thereby deprived them of other business opportunities and of the use and enjoyment of their property.

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