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Fair Use Considerations in DMCA Misrepresentation Claims: First Circuit "Cases of Interest" No Longer Very Interesting

By Amanda Schreyer
http://fierstkane.com/amanda-schreyer

In my recent article, "Misrepresentation Under the DMCA: The State of the Law", NYSBA Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Journal (Spring 2014, Vol. 25, No. 1), I discussed two recent, interesting cases out of the First Circuit: Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran (Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 1:13-cv- 12028 (D. Mass. filed January 25, 2013))(the "Blogger-Giving-the-Finger Photo Case"), and Lessig v. Liberation Music Pty Ltd. (Lessig v. Liberation Music Pty Ltd., 1:13-cv-10159 (D. Mass filed May 20, 2013))(the "Lessig Lisztomania Case"). In those cases, an issue before the District Court of Massachusetts was whether the defendant knowingly made a material misrepresentation in its Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) takedown notice in claiming that the plaintiff's use of the defendant's copyrighted work was infringing. Between the writing of the article and its publication, both cases were dismissed. Tuteur had survived Crossley-Corcoran's motion to dismiss, but Lessig only got as far as an amended complaint before settling. (According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lessig's counsel in the case, the settlement contained the following statement: "Liberation Music agrees that Professor Lessig's use of the Phoenix song 'Lisztomania' was both fair use under US law and fair dealing under Australian law." According to Tuteur (via her blog): "We've settled the lawsuit. The parties have entered into a settlement agreement which has resolved all claims and controversies to their mutual satisfaction.")

In both Tuteur and Lessig, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were liable under §512(f) of the DMCA because they knowinglyv and materially misrepresented that the plaintiffs' use of the defendants' copyrighted works was infringing when they sent takedown notices to the plaintiffs' service providers. Under §512, within a copyright owner's takedown notice, the copyright owner must state that "the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." (§512(c)(3)(A)(v)). While the statute does not provide per se liability for a violation of §512(c)(3)(A)(v), Congress did impose liability on a copyright owner who "knowingly materially misrepresents" that the material it is requesting to be taken down is infringing. Section 512(f) provides:

Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section . . .that material or activity is infringing, ... shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing...

Therefore, a copyright owner should be held liable under §512(f) if he or she "knowingly misrepresents" that he or she has a "good faith belief" that the work is infringing.

Fortunately, the well-known case, Lenz v. Universal (the "Toddler-Dancing-to-the-Prince-Song YouTube Video Case") - a case in which the plaintiff claimed that her use of the defendant's copyrighted work was fair use under the Copyright Act and thus "authorized under the law" - persists in the Ninth Circuit after seven years. In Lenz v. Universal, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008)("Lenz II") the district court held that a copyright owner must evaluate whether the use of the copyrighted work is a fair use prior to sending a takedown notice in order to demonstrate the "good faith belief" that the work is infringing under §512(3)(c)(A)(v), and denied both parties' summary judgment motions. Both parties have appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (Lenz v. Universal, 13-16106 (9th Cir. filed May 31, 2013)).

Tuteur and Lessig were important for DMCA case law because the plaintiffs in both cases also claimed their use of the defendants' copyrighted works was fair use. The Tuteur court, in its order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, rejected Lenz II, holding that in order for a copyright owner to make a "good faith belief" that the use of the work is not "authorized by the law," the owner must consider whether the use of the material is fair use. In addition, that court held that the standard to be applied to the copyright owner sending the takedown notice is the subjective test (See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)) of whether a plaintiff can provide sufficient evidence that the defendant "had some actual knowledge that its [t]akedown [n]otice contained a material misrepresentation," but did not conclude whether Crossley-Corcoran had such actual knowledge.

The dismissal of these cases is disappointing because a decision on the merits would have added to the body of law interpreting the statutory meaning of misrepresentation under the DMCA. It is still unclear what the terms "good faith belief," "authorized by the law" and "knowingly misrepresent," mean in the context of §512. Therefore, the law remains unsettled across the country as to what level of analysis of the use a copyright owner must have taken, and what facts the copyright owner must have known, before sending a DMCA takedown notice, in order to be held liable for misrepresentation under the DMCA.

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on May 11, 2014 9:11 PM.

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