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"Of Facts And Opinions: The Graphic Image Requirement For Cigarette Packages Under The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention And Tobacco Control Act And The Constitutionality Of Compelled Disclosure" by Marcus P. Almond


Of Facts and Opinions: The Graphic Image Requirement For Cigarette Packages Under The 2009 Family Smoking Prevention And Tobacco Control Act And The Constitutionality Of Compelled Disclosure
by Marcus P. Almond
I Introduction

Do federal regulations requiring the top half of all cigarette packages to display graphic, full-color images depicting the dangers of cigarette smoking violate tobacco companies' rights to free speech? See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141). The tobacco industry, of course, says yes, but the courts have responded less categorically. In R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Administration, the first case to examine regulations implementing the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act ("Act"), the court ruled that the images were unconstitutional. See No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *8 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, although it did not examine the actual regulations, nonetheless held that the Act's general image requirement did not offend the First Amendment per se. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073 (6th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2012).

This article supports the determination that the Act is constitutional on its face, but the regulations are unconstitutional under the current state of the law. See id. at *6 (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) ("To succeed in a typical facial attack, [a plaintiff] would have to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be valid....")). Yet, for three reasons, an exception to the rule requiring strict judicial scrutiny of compelled non-factual commercial speech should be crafted for speech intended to deter health risks.

First, current standards of judicial review are ill-suited to this hybrid form of factual and ideological speech. Second, characterizing the current cigarette label as deceptive in order to shoehorn in disclosures of non-factual information as the Sixth Circuit did recently contravenes existing precedent. See id. at *43. Third, health risks entail none of the inherent subjectivity as ideological speech; thus, the protections afforded by strict scrutiny against coerced ideological advocacy are unnecessary. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (describing ideological speech as pertaining to "politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion").

II Relevant Cases and Controlling Law

A. The Relevant Cases

Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States examined the Act's general image requirement, rather than the regulations at issue in R.J. Reynolds. Disc. Tobacco City, 2012 WL 899073, at *1 (citing the lower court case, Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-00117 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2009)). The tobacco companies argued that the requirement's size and prominence violated their rights to free speech. Id. However, Chief District Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky disagreed, and the court granted summary judgement in favor of the government on November 5, 2009. Id. While the tobacco companies were awaiting the Sixth Circuit's review of the lower court's ruling, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") issued its "Final Rule" ("Rule") on June 22, 2011,which mandated nine different images depicting the health risks of smoking pursuant to the Act's general image requirement. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01, 36628 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141); Id. at 36639-52. Less than two months later, five of the largest tobacco companies in the United States filed suit against the FDA. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012).

In the action that followed, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States Food and Drug Administration, the tobacco companies argued that the actual content of the images violated their right to free speech, because the images' emotive character forced the companies to promote the government's opinion that smoking is bad. Id. at *4. Thus, the companies reasoned, the Rule did not qualify for an exception to the compelled commercial speech doctrine, which requires strict scrutiny of compelled non-factual speech. Id. at *3. The FDA countered that the images, which include, inter alia, depictions of diseased lungs, cancerous lesions, and a man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole, accurately convey the incontrovertible risks of smoking, and they do so more effectively than textual warnings alone. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01, 36650 (June 22, 2011)(Images 1, 3, and 4); see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012).

Nonetheless, District Judge Richard J. Leon, a George W. Bush appointee, found that the images communicated a contentious, subjective message designed to convince smokers to quit by eliciting negative emotional reactions. See R.J. Reynolds, 2012 WL 653828, at *6; Julian Pecquet, Another Health Law Faces Court Challenge, HEALTHWATCH (Apr. 8, 2012, 7:50 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/220473-another-obamaadministration-health-law-faces-court-challenge. Thus, the lesser standard of judicial review reserved for disclosures of purely factual information did not apply. R.J. Reynolds, 2012 WL 653828, at *6. Consequently, Judge Leon reviewed the Rule under a heightened standard, and because it was not the least restrictive means to achieve the government's interest, Judge Leon deemed the Rule unconstitutional. Id.; id. at 8.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, had a different take when it eventually reviewed the lower court's ruling in Discount Tobacco City and Lottery, Inc. v. United States. Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073 (6th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2012). Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge Jane B. Stranch first established that the question under review was the facial validity of the Act's general image requirement, not the validity of the Rule's nine specific images. Id. at *34-36. In fact, Judge Stranch took issue with dissenting Judge Eric Clay's failure to differentiate between the two analyses. Id. at *49. Ultimately, the court determined that because the Rule had yet to be published at the time of the initial trial, the constitutionality of the images was beyond the Sixth Circuit's jurisdiction on appellate review. Id.

Nonetheless, Judge Stranch held the Act to be facially valid because the tobacco companies failed to establish that under no set of circumstances could the general image requirement be deemed valid. Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010)). The court cited the seminal case of Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, in which the United States Supreme Court established that commercial speech in the form of images could be an effective and valid means of communicating factual information about a product. Id. at *5 (citing 471 U.S. 626 (1985)); see also Michelle Olsen, Circuit Split Watch: A Divide over Graphic Tobacco Warnings, NAT'L L. J. (Apr. 2, 2012). Thus, because the Act's general image requirement was rationally related to the government's interest in protecting consumers from deceptive advertising, the Act was constitutional. Id. at *50.

Beyond the district court level, the constitutionality of the Rule remains to be seen. Nonetheless, because it has national economic and health consequences, it is likely that the Rule's constitutionality will eventually make its way to the Supreme Court. See Olsen, supra (noting that "the Supreme Court is almost certain to have the final say.... Because a federal statute with nationwide economic and health implications is at stake....).

B. The Controlling Law

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech." See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159 (2009) (U.S. Const. amend. I). The fundamental right to speak one's mind includes the right not to speak someone else's, including the state's. See Pomeranz, supra, at 172 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, (1943) (striking down a law mandating flag salutes in public schools)). This applies in the context of commercial speech, as well, which is broadly defined as speech proposing a commercial transaction. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 (1978)). In Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of California, the Supreme Court wrote, "[f]or corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say." See R.J. Reynolds, 2012 WL 653828, at *4 (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16, (1986) (plurality opinion)). Thus, the Supreme Court has established that compelled speech must survive strict judicial scrutiny, which requires a compelling governmental interest and means that are narrowly tailored to the achievement of the interest. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.

Yet the court has also recognized that a company's interest in not disclosing factual information about the risks associated with its product is outweighed by the government's interest in ensuring a fair and transparent marketplace. Id. at 651 (citing Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., (state-mandated disclosures laws could "appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.")). Thus, strict scrutiny is not appropriate where a disclosure requirement is in response to commercial speech that is deceptive, or even potentially deceptive,and entails purely factual and uncontroversial information. Id. at 652; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (citing Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 641 (6th Cir. 2010)). Instead, in this scenario the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny is the rational basis standard, which merely requires means of disclosure that are rationally related to the government's interest in protecting consumers from deceptive advertising. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.

III Analysis

A. The Compelled Commercial Speech Doctrine Ill Befits Disclosures Intended To Deter Health Risks

The Supreme Court should craft an exception to the rule requiring strict scrutiny of compelled non-factual commercial speech because neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis review are suited for compelled speech intended to deter health risks. For instance, in explaining why the FDA's Rule should not be reviewed under the rational-basis standard, Judge Leon incorrectly concluded that the images did not provide factual information intended to make consumers more aware of the risks associated with smoking. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long recognized that illustrations in advertisements serve important communicative functions in conveying information about a product to consumers. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. Illustrations draw attention to the advertiser's message and succinctly convey information that would otherwise be unwieldy in the limited space of an advertisement. Id.

To wit, the nine images under the Rule can certainly not be said to fail to draw attention to the FDA's message, of which an image of a cadaver with chest staples, for example, speaks volumes. See, e.g., Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01, 36652 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) (image 9). Moreover, Judge Stranch correctly noted that evocation of emotion is a recognized means of effectively communicating with consumers. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073, at *45 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012). Indeed, this fact is not lost on the tobacco companies who, themselves, complained that the FDA's images impeded the companies' own ability to use imagery to create positive associations with their product among consumers. Id. (quoting the tobacco companies' statement at oral argument, "color and imagery are the most effective way to get your ad noticed and communicate a message"). Emotionally evocative imagery is a communicative tool that does not per se constitute or espouse a particular ideology for which First Amendment jurisprudence requires strict scrutiny review.

Yet when the current standards are applied to the Rule's nine images, it is apparent that the Rule must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Photos of a man exhaling cigarette smoke from a tracheotomy tube or a woman sobbing uncontrollably convey neither purely factual nor uncontroversial information. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36652 (images 1 & 8). As Judge Leon rightfully noted, these images symbolize calamities that smoking may portend. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012). Even if done effectively, information communicated through metaphor cannot be described as factual, uncontroversial, or even accurate. Id. (noting that the images were inaccurate).

Another of the FDA's nine images conveys no information about cigarettes whatsoever. Image nine, which the FDA refers to as "man I Quit t-shirt", simply portrays a man wearing a t-shirt which bears the "no smoking" sign and the words "I QUIT." Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36653 (image 9). The image clearly serves no purpose other than expressly attempting to convince smokers to quit. Whatever genuinely sage precautions they may impart, the images simply do not convey the sort of purely factual information for which the Supreme Court has heretofore granted an exception to strict scrutiny. Yet, it cannot be said that the images do not make smokers more aware of the irrefutable risks of smoking. Thus, as non-factual speech intended to deter health risks, it is apparent that the Rule ill befits the current state of the law.

B. Current Cigarette Labels Are Not Deceptive Under Controlling Case Law

An exception should be crafted for disclosures that deter health risks because characterizing cigarette labels as deceptive in order to shoehorn in compelled disclosures of non-factual information contravenes existing Supreme Court precedent. It is well established that the government may require advertisers to disclose information to counteract "commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading." Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985). In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the United States Supreme Court examined an Ohio rule of professional conduct which required attorney advertisements offering services on a contingency-fee basis to disclose that clients may nonetheless be responsible for certain costs even if they lost their case. Id. at 631. Defendant's advertisement stated that clients would owe no "fees" if no recovery was made, but it failed to mention that they could still be responsible for "costs." The Supreme Court upheld the state court's decision that the advertisement was deceptive, because a layman, not familiar with the vernacular of the law, would not reasonably be expected to appreciate the distinction between these two terms of art. Id. at 652. Thus, without expressly disclosing that additional moneys could be owed if clients lost their case, the advertisement was inherently deceptive. Id.

There is no such double speak in the current cigarette label for which it should properly be characterized as deceptive. Despite any misconceptions that consumers may have about the current label's description of certain cigarettes as "Light" and "Low Tar," there is, by any reasonable measure, a large, prominent warning about the health risks of smoking on every package of cigarettes currently sold in the United States. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073, at *43(6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (finding the terms deceptive to cons€umers); see also Alice Park, New Graphic Warning Labels on Cigarettes Pass Another Hurdle, TIME HEALTHLAND (Mar. 20, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/03/20/new-graphic-warninglabels-on-cigarettes-pass-another-hurdle/ (noting that the Act allows the FDA to ban marketing claims like "low tar" and "light"); But see Disc. Tobacco City, 2012 WL 899073, at *44 ("The current warnings take up less than 5% of cigarette packaging and advertising, and the warnings appear on only one side panel of the cigarette pack."). Even if smokers do not fully appreciate that "Light" or "Low Tar" cigarettes are no less harmful than ordinary cigarettes, there is no equivocation as with the advertisement in Zauderer. The current cigarette label conspicuously warns consumers that cigarettes can cause health risks, and thus, it is not deceptive under existing precedent.

Nor should the current label be characterized as potentially deceptive as Judge Stranch suggests. Id. at *8. The court relies on the finding in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc. that tobacco companies previously misled the public about the health risks of smoking, but Judge Stranch cites no authority that the deceptiveness of one advertisement may be assessed by the historical deceptiveness of another. Id. at *43 (citing 566 F.3d 1095, 1105-08, 1119-20, 1122-24 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Even if prior advertisements were valid factors for judging the propriety of an advertisement, Judge Leon points out that "consumers are overwhelmingly aware of the risks of smoking and indeed overestimate those risks." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *8 n.15 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012) (citing JAMIESON & ROMER, WHAT DO YOUNG PEOPLE THINK THEY KNOW ABOUT THE RISKS OF SMOKING 28-30 (2001)).

Moreover, restrictions on potentially deceptive speech still have their bounds. As the Supreme Court has clarified, potentially deceptive commercial speech may not be restricted if it may be "presented in a way that is not deceptive." Discount Tobacco City, 2012 WL 899073, at *7 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). That cigarette packages do not list every potential malady that may befall a smoker does not make them deceptive under the law, and courts should not bestow artificial labels of deception simply because it is an expedient means of passing legislation in the public's interest. Consequently, if the Rule is to be legally implemented, it must done so as a result of a judicially crafted exception to the requirement of strict scrutiny for compelled disclosures of non-factual information.

C. Disclosures To Deter Health Risks Are Materially Different From Ideological Speech

Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court should craft an exception to the requirement of strict scrutiny for non-factual information because speech to deter health risks is materially different from ideological speech. Ideological speech refers to matters of "politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion" and is presumptively unconstitutional. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio , 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Discount Tobacco, 2012 WL 899073, at *4 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)).

For instance, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Supreme Court analyzed a New Hampshire state law that made it a misdemeanor to obscure the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on citizens' license plates. Pomeranz, supra, at 172 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706-07). The Court held that compulsion of this sort must survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 173 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715). Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional because citizens' property was not the states' to use "as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012)

There is no debate that cigarettes cause health risks. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01, 36629 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) ("Tobacco use...has been shown to cause cancer, heart disease, lung disease, and other serious adverse health effects."); see also Disc. Tobacco City, 2012 WL, at *42 ("It is beyond cavil that smoking presents the serious health risks described in the warnings, and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise...."). Yet with ideological speech, there is only debate. New Hampshire could obviously provide no empirical data to support its contention that citizens should live free or die. Yet the FDA has provided vast amounts of empirical data to support its anti-smoking message. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36629-39. Thus, there is an inherent distinction between ideological speech and speech intended to deter health risks.

The authority that Judge Leon relies on to support an argument to the contrary bears this out. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 11-1482, 2012 WL 653828, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 29, 2012) (citing Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006)). In Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the rational-basis standard inapplicable to a state law requiring warning stickers to be placed on video games deemed "sexually explicit." Id. (citing Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 651). "Sexually explicit" is inherently subjective; "the State could have one opinion of what sexually explicit was, the video-game manufacturer another." Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073, at *42 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (citing Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652). In contrast, the physical health risks posed by cigarettes have been established through decades of scientific inquiry and therefore, do not convey a "subjective and highly controversial message" as Judge Leon suggests. See Disc. Tobacco City, 2012 WL, at *42; R.J. Reynolds, 2012 WL 653828, at *6 (citing Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652).

Still, its stylistic choice for image six suggests that the FDA recognizes that there exists a line at which evocative imagery ceases to be a purely communicative tool and crosses over to being an ideological one. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36628-01, 36653 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) (image 6). Instead of a photograph like the rest of the images, image six is a cartoon. Id.; see also R.J. Reynolds, 2012 WL 653828, at *2 (describing image 6 as a "cartoon"). It shows a stylized premature baby in an incubator and is accompanied by the words "WARNING: Smoking During Pregnancy Can Harm Your Baby." Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36653 (image 6). Here, the FDA has abandoned any attempt at accuracy altogether. Most assuredly, the reason why it made this stylistic choice is that the FDA recognized that human sensibilities are more attuned to the suffering of innocents, and if it mandated that photographs of premature infants were to be displayed on cigarette packages, the tobacco companies' complaints would be drowned out by the public outcry. Instead of deterring consumers, this would rightfully be seen as an unconstitutional attempt by the FDA to cast the tobacco companies as malevolent.

Nonetheless, rational-basis review would deftly dispose of such unreasonable disclosure requirements because its objective, community-based standard of reasonableness would expose them as not rationally related to the government's interest in deterrence. With efforts to deter health risks, however, the court would enjoy the added benefit of empirical data to guide its determination of whether a disclosure requirement was rationally related. Therefore, when it is considered that a third of all youth who begin smoking "will die prematurely as a result," and each year, over 440,000 people in the United States die prematurely due to diseases caused by smoking,it is evident that the Supreme Court should recognize the government's substantial interest in deterring its citizens from smoking, and the concomitant imposition on cigarette companies' freedom of speech is a small price to pay to counter such calamity. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234, 10-5235, 2012 WL 899073, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 44396-01, 44398 (Aug. 28, 1996)); Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Hearing on H.R. 1256 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2004) (statement of Richard H. Carmona, Vice Admiral, U.S. Surgeon Gen.); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 658 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 ("[T]he regulatory technique must be in proportion to [the State's] interest.")).

IV Conclusion

Of the liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the freedom of speech is arguably the most precious. Thus, when legislation infringes on this right in any way, the legislation must normally be strictly scrutinized. Yet, the protections afforded by strict judicial scrutiny are unnecessary with legislatively-compelled speech to deter health risks. This type of disclosure does not constitute the sort of subjective, ideological advocacy that strict scrutiny was designed to protect. Thus, the Supreme Court should craft an exception that allows non-factual disclosures where the government's interest is deterrence of health risks. That way, the FDA's Rule may be legally implemented, and the scourge of death and infirmity that cigarettes have wrought upon the citizens of the United States may be effectively and constitutionally combated.

Marcus Almond is a rising 4LE who will be graduating from Seton Hall University School of Law in January 2013. By day, Marcus is a legal researcher in drug and medical-device litigation for a plaintiff's firm in Manhattan. He also is serving as a judicial intern on the Superior Court of New Jersey during the summer.

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on August 4, 2012 1:41 PM.

The previous post in this blog was "For The Good Of All: Why New York's Mandatory Pro Bono Program Will Succeed--With The Right Definition" by Benjamin Pomerance.

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