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"Saving Grace: The First Amendment On Trial In United States v. Apel" by Benjamin Pomerance

Saving Grace: The First Amendment On Trial In United States v. Apel
by Benjamin Pomerance

On December 4, one of the fundamental tenets of American democracy will be on trial before the United States Supreme Court. The First Amendment as we know it hangs in the balance of the outcome. A peaceful protester's rights are at stake, and with it the very ability to speak and express one's political views in a public setting. How the Court will resolve this case is, at this point, very unclear. Yet if a majority of justices rule in a certain way, concerned citizens in every corner of our nation will feel the chilling effect on their freedom.

This article examines the case that will lead to this monumental outcome and the precedents of liberty under review in this conflict. Part I discusses the judicial legacy forged in the United States to protect freedom of speech and expression in a traditional public forum, such as a public sidewalk or street. Part II describes the controversy at the core of United States v. Apel, the case in which the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in December. Lastly, Part III examines the rationale that the Court, applying decades of worthy precedent, should follow in this case. This Court, if it truly is serious about safeguarding the First Amendment, must not weaken the shield that currently defends political protesters in America's public places.

I. A Heritage Of Encouraging Dissent: The Supreme Court's History Of Protecting Speech And Expression In A Traditional Public Forum

A. The Background

Since 1791, the First Amendment has stood as a cornerstone of American values. The First Congress took the remarkable step of limiting its own ability to pass certain laws -- in this case, any law restricting the freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly, and petition -- because of a necessity learned the hard way under British domination: a strong central government, without instituting proper restraints, quickly treads hard on the essential liberties of its subjects. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 315-18 (2005).

The 10 amendments passed by that Congress and ratified by the states represent the freedoms that the American governments, both state and federal, held most sacred. See ID. The inclusion of free speech at the top of that list was not surprising, given that many of the political thinkers influential to the early American statesmen -- from John Milton to Thomas Paine -- wrote strongly about the vital place of uninhibited expression in free societies. Consequently, many of the Framers of American government followed the rationale expressed by Benjamin Franklin in 1722: "Whoever would overthrow the liberty of a nation must begin by subduing the freeness of speech." Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood (letter), No. 8, July 9, 1722 (printed in The New-England Courant).

Through the ensuing years, however, the American government has subdued the freeness of speech and expression in multiple ways. For example, the United States Supreme Court has frequently held that "obscene speech" concerning sex may be banned to protect "the social interest in order and morality." See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). Speech proposing a commercial transaction receives less First Amendment protection than "other constitutionally guaranteed expression" and can be limited in multiple ways by legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). Intentionally defamatory expressions, particularly those against private citizens, can be punished by law. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Children frequently see courts curtail their ability to speak freely inside school grounds. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). And the list of judicially approved First Amendment limitations can go on and on.

Yet there is one First Amendment category that the United States Supreme Court has largely vouchsafed over time: speech and expression in a traditional public forum.

B. Hague And Schneider -- Early Public Forum Doctrine

Caselaw affirming First Amendment protections in a public forum dates back to at least 1939, the year that Jersey City Mayor Frank "Boss" Hague tried to ban union rallies in public places. When the Committee for Industrial Organization sued, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the mayor's ban on political meetings in public places violated the freedom of assembly guarantee in the First Amendment. See Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).

"[S]treets and parks . . . have immemoriably been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions," wrote Justice Owen J. Roberts for the Court's majority. "Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." Id. at 515.

During that same year, the Supreme Court considered another case arising out of New Jersey, an appeal brought by Jehovah's Witnesses charged with violating local ordinances that prohibited people from distributing pamphlets on city streets. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Municipal leaders supporting the ordinances argued that the laws were necessary to prevent people from littering the local roads with discarded handbills. Id. at 161.

Yet the Court was not persuaded. "We are of opinion that (keeping) the streets clean . . . is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it," Justice Roberts stated in the majority opinion. "Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press." See id.

C. Public Forum Evolution In The '60s

In the subsequent decades, the Court heard multiple cases involving protests in streets, sidewalks, parks, and other traditionally public places, particularly during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Essentially, the takeaway from these decisions was as follows: Speech or expression in public settings is permissible even if it angers members of the public, although governmental leaders may terminate the speech if the originally peaceful expression becomes violent or unduly disruptive. See, e.g., Cox, supra; Brown, supra. Speech on state-owned property, such as a jail driveway, received far less protection, and could be limited when government interests such as safety and protection of property were at issue. See Adderley, supra.

D. Flower and Greer -- Traditional Public Forum In The Military Context

An even stronger affirmation of First Amendment protections in traditional public forums occurred in 1972, when the Court upheld free speech interests over the objection of the United States Armed Forces. See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). In this case, military police arrested a civilian protester who was peacefully passing out leaflets on a public street running through Fort Sam Houston in Texas. Id. at 197-98. Since that civilian had been previously barred from Fort Sam Houston by the base commander, the government succeeded in convicting the civilian under a federal law making it a crime to knowingly re-enter a military post after being excluded from that base by any officer. See 18 U.S.C. §1382.

Yet the Supreme Court overturned the conviction. In a per curiam opinion, the Court pointed out that no sentry guarded either entrance of the street on which the protester had stood. Flower, 407 U.S. at 198. In fact, traffic flowed freely along this road 24 hours a day. Id. The street, therefore, was a traditional public forum, just like any other public thoroughfare. Id. Speakers on it were thus entitled to the same significant First Amendment safeguards afforded to any other citizen in such a location. Id. at 198-99.

The fact that the military claimed an interest in regulating this portion of the street did not outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake. Id. at 198. "Under such circumstances, the military has abandoned any claim that it has special interests in who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the avenue," the Court reasoned. "The base commandant can no more order petitioner off this public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city police order any leafleteer off any public street." Id.

Four years later, a similar scenario came before the Court -- but with one game-breaking difference. In the case of Greer v. Spock, the nine justices again evaluated the case of individuals passing out pamphlets on a road that ran through a military base. See 424 U.S. 828, 832-33 (1976). In this situation, however, the street and sidewalks in question were located solely within the guarded grounds of Fort Dix. Id. at 837. Thus, the Court determined that because the roadway was separated from the streets and sidewalks of the city, and were not freely traveled by the general public, the street in question was not a traditional public forum. Id. Unlike Flower, the military had not abandoned its interest in controlling speech and conduct on this road, and the speech in question could be proscribed without violating the First Amendment. Id.

E. The Framework Of Perry

The question of when the government can restrict expressive conduct that does take place in a traditional public forum, however, was not clarified until 1983. In the matter of Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the Court stated that an absolute ban on speech and expression in a traditional public forum would virtually always violate the First Amendment. See 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).

The government may, however, enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech and expression in traditional public forums -- but only if these restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Id. at 45. Thus, the Court made it clear that where speech in a traditional public forum is at question, the government carries a heavy burden to overcome before the Court will even consider upholding such a restriction.

F. Protections Of Grace (And Beyond)

The keynote case demonstrating the safety net around expression in a traditional public forum, decided shortly after the Perry Court articulated this set of standards, was United States v. Grace. Ironically, the controversy in this matter focused on the United States Supreme Court itself. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 172 (1983).

Two people standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building in Washington, D.C., on separate occasions -- one handing out pamphlets protesting political issues, the other carrying a sign on which the text of the First Amendment was inscribed -- were ordered by police officers to leave, and told that they would be arrested if they failed to comply. See id. at 172-74. The federal government argued that the officers were justified in doing so, because Title 40 of the United States code prohibited distributing leaflets and displaying signs favoring or opposing "any party, organization or movement" on Supreme Court grounds. See id. at 175.

Again, however, the Court strongly disagreed with the government. There was no doubt, according to the Court's majority, that the sidewalk around the Supreme Court building qualified as a traditional public forum. Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80. The fact that this particular sidewalk surrounded a particular federal building did not give the government the right to strip away its traditional public forum character. Id. No fence, separation, or barrier indicated that this part of the sidewalk differed from any other part of this heavily traveled public walkway. Id. at 179. The government therefore lacked the right to ban speech in this public thoroughfare. Id. In perhaps the Court's strongest-ever affirmation of traditional public forum First Amendment safeguards, Justice Byron White wrote the following:

"Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expression. Nor may the government transform the character of the property by the expedient of including it within the statutory definition of what might be considered a nonpublic forum parcel of property. The public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes."

Id. at 180.

Given that the prohibition on picketing and distributing written materials on the sidewalks around the Court amounted to a total ban rather than a restriction on the time, place, or manner of the speech, the Court held this law to be unconstitutional. Id. at 183-84. The government's assertions that such a law was necessary to maintain the order, dignity, and security of the Supreme Court did not, in the eyes of the Court itself, survive the strict scrutiny of such a bar on expression in a traditional public forum. Id.

Three decades have passed since the Court's decision in Grace, yet the bedrock concept from this case remains firm. More recent challenges to speech and expression in public streets, public sidewalks, and public parks have all triggered the heavy level of scrutiny required by a traditional public forum. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (recognizing that even streets in normally quiet residential areas qualified as traditional public forums); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (calling public streets "the archetype of a traditional public forum"). Now, however, with the upcoming oral arguments in United States v. Apel, this important tradition of protecting speech in traditional public forums against undue government restrictions will be challenged yet again. How this current Court will handle this latest First Amendment controversy remains to be seen.

II. Today's Challenger: The Issues Confronting The Court In United States v. Apel

The facts in United States v. Apel follow a pattern that by now seems familiar. A peaceful protester, John Apel, was arrested for demonstrating on a public road. See Apel v. United States, 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012). The portion of the road in question, California's heavily traveled Highway 1, overlaps the boundaries of Vandenberg Air Force Base. See id. However, this segment of Highway 1 does not belong to the military base. Instead, since 1962, the State of California and the County of Santa Barbara have held an easement over this roadway. See id. There is no dispute over the validity of this easement. Law enforcement authority in this area concurrently belongs to the State of California and the County of Santa Barbara, as well as Vandenberg Air Force Base. See United States v. Apel, No. 12-1038, Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2.

On a previous occasion, Vandenberg's commander excluded Apel from the premises of the base. Apel v. United States, 676 F.3d at 1202. Apel returned to the base to protest, remaining at all times within a specified area on Highway 1 designated by the base for public protests. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 4. He was convicted under federal law for knowingly re-entering a military base after being excluded from it by an officer -- the same statute that was used to convict the ultimately successful appellant in Flower. Apel v. United States, 676 F.3d at 1202; see Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197.

Apel appealed the outcome of his trial. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision, summarily ruling that because the federal government lacked exclusive possession of the area on Highway 1, the statute barring re-entry into a military base did not apply to this case, and Apel's conviction thus had to be overturned. Apel v. United States, 676 F.3d at 1202. In this short opinion, the Ninth Circuit did not even reach the First Amendment issue of whether Apel's conduct qualified as protected expression within a traditional public forum.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the government now argues that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the law, and that nothing in the statute in question requires exclusive federal jurisdiction over the military base property in order to convict. See United States v. Apel, No. 12-1038, Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 1. The government further states that to rule otherwise would threaten national security interests, asserting that "the Ninth Circuit's approach threatens substantial harm to the safe and orderly operation of many of this Nation's military installations." Id. at 1-2.

As for the First Amendment questions raised by this case, the government requests that the Supreme Court not decide this case on federal constitutional grounds because the Ninth Circuit did not raise constitutional issues in its decision. Id. at 5. Even if the Court were to decide the case on First Amendment principles, however, the government claims that because the statute prohibiting re-entry onto a military base applies to all people equally, and because this law "serves a significant government interest by barring entry to a military base by persons whose previous conduct demonstrates that they are a threat to security," the First Amendment would not protect Apel's actions. Id.

III. A Just Outcome: Why The Supreme Court Should Maintain Its Valuable Precedent By Recognizing Proper First Amendment Protections For This Conduct

There is no denying that the government's statutory argument in Apel makes a strong point: namely, the lack of an exclusive control requirement within the statute itself. The text of the federal law criminalizing a party's knowing re-entry to a military base after being ejected from that base includes no provision demanding exclusive federal jurisdiction over the base property. See 18 U.S.C. §1382 (2013). On the other hand, Apel's counsel demonstrates that caselaw dating back to 1948 does read an exclusive possession requirement into the law. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 6. If this argument were to succeed, the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and county over this easement on Highway 1 would, as the Ninth Circuit held, prevent Apel's conviction under this federal law.

Potentially, the Supreme Court could decide Apel solely upon this issue, just as the Ninth Circuit did. Yet this current incarnation of the Supreme Court is extremely active in free speech jurisprudence. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom: The Roberts Court, The First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409 (2013). Since the appointment of John Roberts as Chief Justice, the Court has authored nearly 30 First Amendment free expression opinions, revealing a mixed record in this area. See id.

On one hand, this Court has recognized high First Amendment protections for extremely controversial forms of expression, including protesting with vulgar signs at a military funeral, selling violent video games to minors, profiting from making videos depicting extreme animal cruelty, and lying about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012).

On the other hand, this Court has also proven its willingness to abridge free speech in cases where the government asserts national security concerns. See, e.g., Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010) (providing non-violent legal advice to a group designated as a suspected terrorist organization is not expression protected by the First Amendment); see also Marjorie Heins, The Supreme Court and Political Speech in the 21st Century: The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 76 ALB. L. REV. 561 (2013).

From this short summary, it is clear that the Roberts Court is unafraid to leave its mark on the First Amendment. (For more on this Court's free speech record, see Panel Discussion on Recent U.S. Supreme Court Free Speech Cases and Their Implications, 76 ALB. L. REV. 781 (2013)). Thus, it seems likely that the Court will reach a First Amendment conclusion in deciding Apel. Based on the Court's past record, it is difficult to predict how the Court will resolve the First Amendment issues at work in this case. Yet if the Court chooses to remain true to its own laudable precedent regarding expression in a traditional public forum, there is only one outcome appropriate here.

A. Apel's Protest Constitutes Protected Activity In A Traditional Public Forum

There is no reasonable dispute that a peaceful protest on a political issue qualifies as conduct protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983). The lone question remaining, then, is whether Apel delivered his protest in an area protected under the traditional public forum doctrine.

Highway 1 is a public street. As the cases discussed earlier in this article showed, public roads are recognized as traditional public forums in even the most limited interpretations of this rule. For instance, the Court in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators held that only two areas are always viewed as traditional public forums, but that public streets are always one of these protected categories. 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Public roadways are, in the words of the Court itself, "the archetype of a traditional public forum." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).

The lingering issue, though, is whether the presence of this portion of Highway 1 on Vandenberg Air Force Base destroys the traditional public forum character of this roadway. Put another way, the Court must decide whether this segment of Highway 1 is analogous to the road in Greer v. Spock, where the Court held that the street on the military base was not a traditional public forum, or whether this area is akin to the avenue in Flower v. United States, where the Court found that the street to be a traditional public forum despite its overlap with military property. See Part I, supra.

A reading of Apel's facts shows that the Flower analysis is a far better fit. Like the roadway in Flower, traffic flows freely all day long through this section of Highway 1. There are no sentries, checkpoints, or other indications to drivers, passengers, or pedestrians that this particular section of Highway 1 is different from the rest of this heavily traveled thoroughfare. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 33. In fact, a public bus stop and a public middle school both stand very close to the area where Apel was protesting. Id. at 1, 3. Indeed, with the State of California and the County of Santa Barbara holding an easement over this stretch of road, the public character of this street is even more apparent than the roadway in Flower. Thus, here, as in Flower, the military has "abandoned any claim that it has special interest" in regulating speech and expression on this portion of Highway 1.

Equally influential in this analysis is the Court's decision in Grace. Justice White's majority opinion made it clear that a traditional public forum does not lose this status merely because it abuts government property. United State v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,180 (1983). Thus, even though the Supreme Court building was not a place historically held open as a forum for speech and expression, the sidewalks surrounding it -- which were impossible to differentiate from any other sidewalks in the city -- remained a traditional public forum. Id. Similarly, while Vandenberg Air Force Base itself is not a traditional public forum, the public highway running unimpeded through this corner of the base does not lose the public forum protections afforded to public streets.

"The sidewalks comprising the outer boundaries of the (Supreme) Court grounds are indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C., and we can discern no reason why they should be treated any differently," Justice White wrote in Grace. Id. at 179. The same principle applies to the segment of road at issue in this present controversy.

In fact, the only distinguishing mark on this portion of Highway 1 actually enhances the First Amendment standing of Apel's case. Back in 1989, Vandenberg Air Force Base personnel had painted a green line on the roadway outside the main gate of the base. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2. This line designated a particular area on the road for peaceful protestors to use. Id. At all times during his protest, Apel remained inside this specified protest area. Id. at 4. Thus, Apel not only stood on a public street, an area safeguarded for decades as a traditional public forum, but protested within a region on that street assigned expressly for that purpose. If the street itself were somehow deemed not to be a public forum, the spot in which Apel stood clearly qualifies as a place "historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities." Grace, 461 U.S. at 177.

Thus, it is evident that Apel conducted his protests at all times within a public forum. The government, therefore, may curtail his speech only through reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and only if these limitations are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and "leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Grace, 461 U.S. at 177. We now move to an examination of whether the government has met this substantial burden in Apel.

B. The Government Cannot Meet Its Required Burden, Making This Restriction On Apel's Speech Unconstitutional

As already noted, the federal government argues that overturning Apel's conviction would threaten "substantial harm to the safe and orderly operation of many of this nation's military operations." Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 10. A ruling in Apel's favor, according to the government, would place base commanders in a difficult position, forcing them to either ban all civilian traffic on military property or to tolerate "disruptive and even dangerous conduct by repeat offenders who refuse to comply with base rules and regulations." Id. Additionally, the government claims that any previous violator of base policies "remains a threat to enter the base and cause harm to persons or property" therein, thus giving the government a compelling interest in excluding them. Id. at 10-11.

Still, these reasons seem to fall well short of demonstrating a significant government interest in criminalizing Apel's peaceful protest. To begin with, the government deals solely with generalities in these arguments, painting with broad brush strokes the specter of "substantial harm to the safe and orderly operation" of America's military facilities. Never does the government proffer any concrete examples of precisely how Apel's demonstration on a public highway threatened the "safe and orderly operation" of Vandenberg Air Force Base. In fact, the government fails to describe how such protests would disrupt security and order at any American military installation. These vague scare tactics by the government, without more, should not be enough to outweigh the First Amendment interests of protecting expressive conduct in a traditional public forum.

The government's most material claim centers on the concern that base commanders will be forced to ether restrict all civilian traffic or frequently tolerate disruptive and dangerous conduct by "repeat offenders." Yet this prediction is unfounded. Caselaw clearly shows that the government retains the right to stop expressive conduct in a traditional public forum if that speech or expression provokes violence, imminent danger, or other undue disruptions. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). Therefore, allowing Apel's non-violent, non-threatening protest will not expose military bases to the dire future that the government hypothesizes. Military leaders will continue to retain the right to end speech and expression in a traditional forum in those exceptional circumstances where the speech or expression causes violence or clearly puts the safety of others in danger.

Just as the Grace Court found no evidence that the appellants had obstructed the sidewalks around the Supreme Court building, nothing in this case suggests that Apel's presence on this public road endangered Vandenberg Air Force Base in any way. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 182. Thus, the federal government cannot meet its burden of showing that this law is narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest. Apel's conviction for protesting in a traditional public forum deserves to be overturned on First Amendment grounds.

IV. Final Thoughts

After the Court hears oral arguments in Apel on December 4, the wait will begin to see how, if at all, the First Amendment as we know it will change. As this article demonstrates, the Court should follow the precedent set down in Grace, Flower, and so many other cases solidifying constitutional protections of speech and expression in a traditional public forum. This discussion showed that Apel peacefully protested at all times in the most established of all traditional public forums -- a public street -- and that the military base's proximity to this street does not deprive it of public forum status. It further described how the government does not even come close to proving that this law barring any re-entry to the base is narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest.

The Court should not permit this conviction of a non-violent protester in a traditional public forum to stand. Doing so would reverse decades of precedent in this area of the law. Even more detrimentally, it would weaken one of the fundamental precepts for which the First Amendment stands: the ability to speak and express freely, particularly in areas traditionally held open for these essential democratic activities.

"Speech is powerful," Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Snyder v. Phelps, the case holding that protestors on a public sidewalk outside a military funeral received full First Amendment protection. "As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate." See 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). Truer words regarding the First Amendment were never spoken. Today, with the impending decision in United States v. Apel, America will soon find out if the Chief Justice and his brethren truly meant what they said.

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on November 14, 2013 3:45 PM.

The previous post in this blog was "Rape By Fraud, Deception, Or Impersonation - An Addition To New York's Penal Law: Rape In The First Degree Statute" by Daniel J. Slomnicki.

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